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Abstract
In this paper, we study the economics of parking provision for the morning commute, where all the parking
lots are owned and operated by private operators. The parking capacity allocations, parking fees and access times
are considered in a parking market. First we solve the parking market equilibrium without regulatory intervention,
revealing four types of competitive equilibrium. Only one of the four types of equilibrium, however, is found to
be stable and realistic, and under it each parking area is preferred by the commuters during certain time periods.
Compared to the case without parking choice, provision of parking through a competitive market is able to reduce
commuters’ travel cost and queuing delay, but it does not necessarily lead to the most desirable market outcome
that minimizes social cost or commuter cost. This issue can be addressed through market regulations, such as price-
ceiling, capacity-ﬂoor or capacity-ceiling, and a quantity tax/subsidy regulation. It is found that both price-ceiling
and quantity tax/subsidy regulations can eﬃciently reduce both the system cost and commuter cost under certain
conditions, and help ensure the stability of the parking market. Numerical examples are also provided to illustrate
how parking regulations aﬀect the morning commute pattern and system performance.
Keywords: Parking, Competitive parking equilibrium, Morning commute, Price-ceiling regulation, Quantity
tax/subsidy regulation
1. Introduction
Parking at downtowns of large urban areas is often a headache to commuters and visitors alike. As such, the fee
and availability of parking can ﬁgure prominently in a traveler’s trip plan to downtowns: when to depart, what mode
and which route to take can all be aﬀected by the cost and availability of parking. It is then not diﬃcult to imagine that
parking can be a useful instrument in managing travel demand and taming traﬃc congestion in crowded downtowns.
Compared to congestion pricing, using parking to manage traﬃc can be less controversial, since drivers are already
accustomed to pay a fee for using parking lots in downtowns. Assuming that the parking lots (or areas) are owned
and operated privately, this paper investigates how, during the morning commute, parking locations, capacities and
charges are determined by a parking market and how they aﬀect the travel patterns and network performances in a
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linear city. Furthermore, we study how a regulatory agency can induce a desirable market outcome and mitigate traﬃc
congestion through parking regulations.
Although there are many empirical studies on various aspects of parking (Vianna et al., 2004, Thompson et al.,
1998, e.g.,), analytical models for studying this problem are rare in the literature. Among the few, several scholars
studied parking fees in the context of static networks. Glazer (1992) assumed a constant road-usage fee and constant
travel cost besides parking cost for all the travelers using a simpliﬁed network and showed that a lump-sum parking fee
may increase the social welfare. Rather than assuming pre-determined parking demands and constant travel cost for
all the travelers, Arnott and Rowse (1999) developed a structural model of parking for a ring-road network. Assuming
travelers’ choice of parking lot is uniformly distributed on the ring-road, they derived the expected parking time,
driving time and cruising distance for searching available parking spaces. In both studies a constant parking fee (lump
sum or per unit) is charged in the downtown area for all travelers regardless where they park. Verhoef et al. (1995),
on the other hand, assumes that travelers are charged based on where they park. The latter carried out a diagrammatic
analysis on how parking aﬀects individual travel cost and the modal split and used the insights obtained therein to
develop a spatial parking model. Bifulco (1993) introduced parking types, fees and average walking times in a static
traﬃc assignment model so as to evaluate various parking policies in a general urban network. The idea behind those
studies is to incorporate and determine a parking fee or a set of parking fees in the commuters’ travel cost structure
so that the morning commute pattern and its resulting social welfare can be evaluated. This implicitly assumes that
a public parking operator has full control of the parking prices, while in the real world a competitive parking market
may exist. More recently, Anderson and de Palma (2004) studied the parking problem under a private parking operator
in a monopolistically competitive market, paying particular attention to a commuter’s time wasted on searching for
a vacant parking spot. But no traﬃc model was used to link parking to congestion and vice versa in the market
equilibrium. Overall, all those models did not consider the availability and accessibility of parking spaces, which may
also substantially aﬀect the morning commute pattern and network performance.
Whereas the aforementioned studies considered neither departure time choice nor a competitive parking market,
Arnott et al. (1991) studied the parking problem in the the context of dynamic user equilibrium and considered a
competitive parking market. They assumed that the parking spaces are continuously distributed along the freeway
near the CBD and the number of parking spaces per unit distance from the CBD is constant. Then they embedded
the parking problem in the well-known morning commute model (Vickrey, 1969) to show that parking fee itself can
be eﬃcient in increasing social welfare, and a combination of road toll and parking fee can yield the system optimum
that maximized social welfare. However, the parking fee determined by a competitive parking market can be welfare-
reducing relative to the case of no pricing at all, but it would still be eﬃcient if combined with an optimal time-varying
toll. Such a setup for parking was further extended by Zhang et al. (2008) to derive the daily commuting pattern that
combines both the morning and evening commute.
Unlike Arnott et al. (1991) where parking is centrally provided and continuously distributed over space, in this
paper we study the parking problem for the morning commute from a diﬀerent perspective. First, we assume there is
a ﬁnite number of parking lot clusters (or areas) that the parking lots within each cluster charge the same fee and has
the same access time to the CBD. Second, we take both the capacity and access time of each cluster as variables, to
be determined by the market and commuting equilibria. As a matter of fact, both variables can substantially change
the commute pattern and cost. Third and more importantly, we assume all the parking lots are privately owned
and there exists a parking market where each private parking operator determines the parking fee, parking capacity
and accessibility to compete with others. Since such parking provision may not produce the most desirable market
outcome in terms of system performance or traﬃc congestion, we also consider several market regulations and study
their eﬀects on the travelers’ travel cost and operators’ proﬁt/cost in the morning commute.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst present the model of a parking market for the morning
commute and its key assumptions in Section 2. In Section 3, we review the commuting patterns under departure-
time equilibrium for any given set of parking fees, capacities and access times from the parking lots to the oﬃces. In
Section 4, we solve the parking market equilibrium without regulations, and discuss the characteristics of the resulting
commuting patterns in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the market regulation and how it aﬀects the social cost and travel
delay of the morning commuters. A numerical example is provided in Section 7 and ﬁnally, Section 8 concludes the
paper.
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2. The Combined Parking/Departure-Time Equilibrium Model
In this section, we describe the problem setup and model assumptions, as well as introduce the notations and
deﬁnitions used throughout the paper. As in a typical morning commute problem (Vickrey, 1969), we assume that in
the morning rush hour, commuters who start work at time t∗ depart from home and take a highway (such as a freeway)
to get to their oﬃces. The highway has a bottleneck with capacity s, and because s is ﬁnite, queuing usually occurs
at the bottleneck when travelers choose a departure time to minimize their own travel costs. Also, depending on his
departure time t, a commuter can arrive at his oﬃce earlier than t∗, punctually, or later than t∗. A commuter’s travel
cost therefore consists of the monetary cost of his actual travel time and early or late arrival penalty. Without loss
of generality, a zero free-ﬂow travel time is assumed. The generalized travel cost of a commuter departing at time t
reads,
C(t) = αw(t) +max{β(t∗ − t − w(t)), γ(t + w(t) − t∗)} (1)
where w(t) denotes the queuing delay of a traveler departing at time t, α, β and γ are the monetary values attached to
queuing delay (also called values of time), schedule delay (VSD) of early and late arrival, respectively (γ > β).
As in the classical morning commute problem, in this paper we consider a simpliﬁed network as depicted in Figure
1. It consists of a major highway and multiple clusters of parking lots, connected by local streets. For simplicity we
again assume the travel times on the local streets are zero. Moreover, we limit our investigation to the case of two
parking clusters, with each cluster represents one or multiple parking lots in either the central area of the city (the
central cluster) or a peripheral location of the city (the peripheral cluster). The central cluster usually charges a higher
fee but has shorter access time to one’s oﬃce, compared with the peripheral cluster.
We assume that parking spaces within each cluster are identical, that is, they cost the same amount to park and
have the same access time from the lots to the oﬃces in the CBD. This assumption may be reasonable because, 1)
from the consumer side, most commuters have an expected parking cost (inclusive of parking fee and access time)
when they determine a parking area prior to their trips. Although the actual parking fee or access time may vary
slightly dependent on the space chosen within an area (cluster), commuters may perceive all the parking spaces in that
cluster indiﬀerently. Moreover, the access times among parking spaces within a cluster may vary, but the diﬀerences
are usually small compared with the overall commuting time; 2) from the parking operator side, even though parking
spaces within each cluster may be operated by a number of private companies, the parking prices of those parking
lots locating at approximately the same distance from the oﬃces are likely to be the same. This is because those
private operators within one cluster oﬀer similar services, so the competition among them would equilibrate their
prices. Moreover, they are more likely to cooperate to compete with parking lots located at other clusters. Based on
this assumption, the parking market can be viewed as an “oligopolistic” market where the union of parking operators
in the central cluster competes with the union of those in the peripheral cluster.
Figure 1: A simpliﬁed network with a choice of two parking clusters
In the morning rush hour, a total demand of N commuters heading for the CBD area (their oﬃces) ﬁrst go though
a bottleneck, then choose to park his vehicle in either the central parking cluster or the peripheral parking cluster,
and ﬁnally walk (or use other modes, e.g., take the parking shuttle) to their oﬃces. We use K1 and K2 (all in vehicle
units) to represent the eﬀective capacity of the central and peripheral clusters, respectively, i.e. the number of parking
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spaces used by the travelers. p1 and p2 denote the parking fees, and l1 and l2 the access times of the respective parking
clusters (l1 < l2). Here, access time measures the accessibility of parking spaces and may not be walking time alone.
For example, the farther parking lots oﬀer a lower charge and provide shuttle bus service to attract commuters, the
access time in this case consists of the average travel time of the shuttle bus plus the actual time from the bus station
to the oﬃce on foot. In addition, the cost of providing a parking space per day in the two clusters is denoted by a1
and a2, respectively. It is assumed that a1 < p1, a2 < p2, i.e., both parking clusters are proﬁtable. Since l1 < l2, it is
reasonable to assume that p1 ≥ p2 (that is, the parking fee inside of the CBD is usually no less than in the peripheral
area) and a1 > a2 (that is, it is cheaper to provide a parking space in the peripheral than inside of the CBD).
Adding the costs associated with parking to a commuter’s travel cost, a commuter departing at time t and choosing
the parking cluster i has the following generalized travel cost,
Ci(t) = αw(t) +max{β(t∗ − t − w(t) − li), γ(t + w(t) + li − t∗)} + pi + λli (2)
where i = 1, 2 and λ is the equivalent monetary cost of one unit of access time. We assume β < λ, which is consistent
with Arnott et al. (1991) and supported by empirical evidence. Although in reality commuters may value travel time,
schedule delay and access time diﬀerently, in this paper we do not diﬀerentiate the commuters in terms of their values
of time. Their work starting time t∗ is also assumed to be identical for all commuters.
Now we are ready to give the deﬁnitions of two equilibria, the competitive parking equilibrium associated with
the parking market deﬁned above, and the day-to-day dynamic user equilibrium associated with the day-to-day
departure time choices in the morning commute.
Deﬁnition 1. In a parking market, the allocation of parking capacities, K¯1, K¯2, parking fees, p¯1, p¯2, and access times,
l¯1, l¯2, constitute a competitive parking equilibrium if,
1. Private parking operators in each cluster locally maximize their proﬁts by setting their own parking fee, capac-
ity and access time, given the price of the other cluster, i.e. maxKipi − Kiai (i = 1, 2)
2. Travelers maximize their utilities (i.e. minimize the generalized travel cost in this case) by choosing a departure
time and parking location, given the parking fees, capacity allocations and access times of both clusters, which
is represented by a commuters’ User Equilibrium deﬁned later.
3. Market clearing, i.e. K1 + K2 = N. Each of the commuters will choose one of the parking cluster to park his
car.
The second condition of the competitive parking equilibrium is in itself an equilibrium. This so-called dynamic
user equilibrium (UE) (e.g., deﬁned by Vickrey (1969) and Arnott et al. (1990)) is the result of day-to-day departure
time adjustments made by commuters’ to minimize their travel costs based on their driving experiences from previous
days. Here we provide the deﬁnition of the dynamic UE considering parking as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Given the bottleneck capacity, parking facilities and parking prices, the commuters in the morning
commute achieve a day-to-day dynamic user equilibrium if, 1) all commuters are aware of the traﬃc conditions,
parking capacities, access times and prices after their day-to-day driving experience, and they choose their departure
times and parking clusters such that their generalized travel costs are the same, and 2) no commuter can unilaterally
change his parking location and/or his departure time to reduce his generalized travel cost.
Whenever the bottleneck capacity, or the parking fee/location/capacity changes, it is assumed that a new day-to-
day user equilibrium forms after a suﬃcient period of day-to-day adjustments to departure times and parking locations.
In addition, we use total cost and network queuing delay to measure the performance of the system. The total
commuter travel cost (TCC), represented by the total queuing delay and schedule delay of all travelers, plus the total
parking fees paid by those travelers, is given by
TCC = N ×C (3)
where C is the identical generalized travel cost of all travelers under the day-to-day UE, given by Equation 2. The
total system cost (TSC) is the total queuing delay and schedule delay of all travelers, plus the total investment cost of
those private operators. Therefore,
TSC = (TCC − p1K1 − p2K2) + (a1K1 + a2K2)
= TCC − ((p1 − a1)K1 + (p2 − a2)K2) (4)
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where the second term of the RHS is exactly the proﬁts of private operators.
3. User Equilibrium Traﬃc Proﬁles
In this section, we brieﬂy review all possible traﬃc patterns under the day-to-day user equilibrium for any given
set of parking fees, capacity allocations and access times (i.e. p1, p2,K1,K2, l1, l2). These traﬃc patterns, derived in
Qian and Zhang (2009), are central to obtain the competitive parking equilibrium.
By introducing,
v1 = p1 + λl1 − βl1
v2 = p2 + λl2 − βl2
u1 = p1 + λl1 + γl1
u2 = p2 + λl2 + γl2
the generalized travel cost of a traveler choosing the central parking cluster becomes,
C1(t) =
{
αw(t) + β (t∗ − t − w(t)) + v1 if early arrival
αw(t) + γ (t + w(t) − t∗) + u1 if late arrival (5)
and the generalized travel cost of a traveler choosing the peripheral parking cluster becomes,
C2(t) =
{
αw(t) + β (t∗ − t − w(t)) + v2 if early arrival
αw(t) + γ (t + w(t) − t∗) + u2 if late arrival (6)
In Qian and Zhang (2009), ﬁve types of parking location preference were identiﬁed, and they are described one
by one below.
Strongly outward. If v2 > v1 i.e. p1 − p2 < (λ − β)(l2 − l1), which ensures u2 > u1, then C1(t) < C2(t) in both
early arrival and late arrival. In this case, commuters will prefer the central parking cluster that is closer to
their oﬃces in both early arrival and late arrival. The farther one (i.e. the peripheral cluster) will not be used
unless the closer parking lots in the central cluster are used up. Because commuters choose to use the closer
parking cluster ﬁrst and then the farther one, the central cluster is strongly preferred and we call this type
of parking preference strongly outward. Strongly outward parking occurs when the farther parking cluster is
not suﬃciently competitive, possibly because either its parking fee is not suﬃciently low or it is located too
far away from commuters’ oﬃces. There are four possible travel proﬁles for strongly outward parking, the
condition of each proﬁle and its corresponding total commuter travel cost (TCC) are listed in Appendix A.
Weakly outward. If v2 = v1 i.e. p1 − p2 = (λ − β)(l2 − l1), which ensures u2 > u1, then C1(t) = C2(t) in early arrival
but C1(t) < C2(t) in late arrival. In this case, the parking fees and access times of the two parking clusters are
such that travelers are indiﬀerent to them in early arrival. Since late arrival is weighted more heavily than the
early arrival (γ > β), the closer parking cluster oﬀers an advantage over the farther one in late arrival. Thus the
central cluster is preferred in general but the preference is not as strong as in the previous case. This type of
parking preference is termed weakly outward. In early arrival when travelers have no preference in one cluster
over the other, we assume they are equally likely to choose any one of the two. There are ﬁve possible travel
proﬁles in weakly outward parking.
Strongly inward. If u2 < u1 i.e. p1 − p2 > (λ + γ)(l2 − l1), which ensures v2 < v1, then C1(t) > C2(t) in both
early arrival and late arrival. In this case, commuters will prefer the farther parking cluster in both early and
late arrival. The closer cluster will not be used unless the farther one is used up. Because commuters choose
to use the farther parking cluster ﬁrst and then the closer one, we call this type of parking preference strongly
inward. This type of parking preference occurs when either the closer parking cluster charges a high parking
fee or the access time of the farther cluster is reasonably close to the closer one. There are in all four possible
travel proﬁles in strongly inward parking.
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Weakly inward. If u2 = u1 i.e. p1 − p2 = (λ + γ)(l2 − l1), which ensures v2 < v1, then C1(t) > C2(t) in early arrival
and C1(t) = C2(t) in late arrival. In this case, the parking fees and access times of the two parking clusters are
such that commuters have no preference in one over the other in late arrival. Since early arrival is weighted less
heavily than the late arrival (β < γ) in commuters’ travel costs, the farther cluster oﬀers a cost advantage over
the closer one in early arrival. Thus, the peripheral (farther) cluster is said to be weakly preferred, leading
to the “weakly inward” parking choice. In late arrival when two parking clusters are treated indiﬀerently by
commuters, they are equally likely to choose any of the two. There are in all ﬁve possible travel proﬁles in
weakly inward parking.
Hybrid. If v2 < v1 and u2 > u1, i.e. (λ − β)(l2 − l1) < p1 − p2 < (λ + γ)(l2 − l1), then C1(t) > C2(t) in early arrival
but C1(t) < C2(t) in late arrival. In this case, commuters will prefer the farther parking cluster in early arrival
but the closer one in late arrival. We call this type of parking preference hybrid, since it is a hybrid of inward
parking and outward parking with each cluster strongly preferred in a certain time period. Hybrid parking may
occur when the farther parking cluster oﬀers a suﬃciently high cost saving for commuters in early arrival, but
not enough to attract commuters in late arrival. In the case of late arrival, travelers would rather pay a high
parking fee to use the closer parking cluster than paying a high late-arrival penalty by using the farther parking
cluster. There are in all six possible travel proﬁles in hybrid parking.
The preference on a parking cluster is essentially determined by parking fees and access times of both parking
clusters, regardless of availability of parking spaces. However, parking capacity plays an important role in determining
a certain travel pattern and the market shares between the two parking clusters. For example, in strongly inward or
strongly outward parking, if suﬃcient parking spaces (> N) in the preferred parking cluster are provided, then the
other parking cluster will never be used. If the parking spaces in the preferred parking cluster are limited and cannot
accommodate all the travelers, then the travel pattern under user equilibrium is such that travelers who use the preferred
parking cluster must depart home earlier than those who use the other. Therefore, three factors of parking, fee, access
time and capacity, altogether determine the travel pattern, and each of them inﬂuences travelers’ departure times and
thus system performance.
There are in all 20 possible types of travel proﬁles (i.e. cumulative departure curve and arrival curve) under those
ﬁve types of parking preference. We derived each travel proﬁle and its corresponding TCC as shown in Table A.1
in Appendix A (TSC will simply be the sum of TCC and operators’ investment cost). More details on the proﬁles
and their derivations can be found in Qian and Zhang (2009). Each proﬁle is achieved under a certain condition with
respect to parking capacity, fee and access time, which is expressed by an inequality in terms of capacity bounds in
the second column of the table. Those conditions can also be rewritten as an inequality in terms of bounds of either
parking fee or access time.
Note that the eﬀective capacity of one parking cluster equals to its actual capacity only if this cluster is preferred.
In the table we only use the capacity of the preferred cluster to express the proﬁle conditions as well as in the formula
of the TCCs. For example, in strongly outward parking, the central cluster is always preferred. The proﬁles and TCCs
under strongly outward parking are dependent on the (actual) capacity of the central cluster, while the peripheral
cluster does not take eﬀects as long as the preferred (central) cluster can provide suﬃciently many spaces to serve the
total demand1. Therefore, in strongly outward parking, we use K1 to express all the inequality proﬁle conditions and
TCCs, although the eﬀective capacity of the farther cluster, K2 = N − K1, can do the same job. In each proﬁle of
hybrid, weakly outward and weakly inward parking, both the central and the peripheral cluster may be preferred (at
least weakly preferred) under certain time periods. In those cases, the proﬁle conditions and TCCs are expressed in
terms of either K1 or K2, whichever eﬀectively determines the proﬁle.
4. The case of parking provision without regulations
In this section, we study the case of a parking market without regulatory intervention. We ﬁrst solve the com-
petitive parking equilibrium based on the UE traﬃc proﬁles presented in Section 3, then discuss its properties and
ﬁnally examine how changes in parking fee, access time and parking capacity aﬀects market performance through a
1The other parking cluster will always build suﬃcient capacity if the preferred cluster is short of demand, since this can bring in proﬁts
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sensitivity analysis. Because access time is a less ﬂexible control factor than parking fee and capacity, we ﬁrst assume
it is ﬁxed in the short term in deriving the competitive parking equilibrium (that is, the parking operators adjust the
parking fees and eﬀective capacities to achieve the competitive equilibrium, taking the access time as given in the
short term), then we can show how it aﬀects the competitive equilibrium when it changes in the long term.
4.1. The competitive parking equilibrium
Let Δl = l2 − l1 > 0 and Δp = p1 − p2 ≥ 0. p¯1, p¯2 and K¯1, K¯2 denote the parking fee and capacity allocation of
the central and peripheral clusters under the competitive equilibrium, respectively. We will show that there are in all
four equilibria: Type I in strongly outward parking, Type II in weakly outward parking, Type III in weakly inward
parking, and Type IV in hybrid parking. We now discuss the competitive equilibria under each of the ﬁve types of
parking location preference.
As can be seen from Table A.1, if the competition leads to parking fees and access times such that the strongly
outward or strongly inward parking occurs, then there exists a preferred parking cluster where the private operators
who manage it will always build N parking spaces so that all the travelers will use their parking spaces and their proﬁts
are maximized. Since the private operators in the other cluster will never have any consumers in that case, under such
a parking market, they can always attract consumers by reducing their parking charge to induce a transition from the
strongly outward or inward parking to other types of parking under which their lots are preferred by some travelers.
However, there is one (and the only) case that the less favored cluster is unable to secure a market share no matter
how its spaces are priced. This occurs when p1 ≤ (λ − β)Δl. If the parking charge of the closer cluster is set to be
suﬃciently low, say p1 < (λ − β)Δl, then the farther parking cluster will not attract any commuters even if its spaces
are free. When p1 = (λ − β)Δl, the private operators will not build any lot in the farther cluster because they will not
make any proﬁt, although travelers are indiﬀerent to parking locations in early arrival when p2 = 0. Therefore, we
show that a competitive equilibrium of Type I occurs when,
K¯1 = N (7a)
K¯2 = 0 (7b)
p¯1 = (λ − β)(l2 − l1) (7c)
where the operators in the closer cluster set a low parking price so that it can attract all the travelers and the farther
parking cluster is never used, and meanwhile the proﬁts of the operators in the closer parking cluster are locally
maximized.
When the parking fee in the closer cluster is priced higher than (λ − β)Δl, the operators in the farther cluster can
always set a price to get a market share with some proﬁts. Therefore, both strongly inward and strongly outward
parking cannot occur in the competitive equilibrium other than Type I.
Weakly outward or weakly inward parking may occur in the competitive equilibrium. For weakly outward park-
ing, in Proﬁles No. 12 and 13 (the proﬁles are numbered in Table A.1 in Appendix A), K2 eﬀectively determines
the parking usage and thus, the operators in the farther cluster are always willing to build as many parking spaces as
possible to attract commuters so as to increase their proﬁts; while in Proﬁles No. 14, 15 and 16, K1 similarly deter-
mines the parking usage and the operators in the closer cluster will also build as many parking spaces as possible.
There exists a capacity allocation at the boundary between Proﬁles No. 13 and 14 such that the operators in both
clusters cannot further increase their market share by building more spaces and keeping a constant relative parking
price (i.e. Δp = (λ − β)(l2 − l1) as the required condition of weakly outward parking), which satisﬁes the deﬁnition of
the competitive parking equilibrium. Therefore, a competitive equilibrium of Type II occurs when,
K¯1 = N − 12
Nγ
β + γ
(8a)
K¯2 =
1
2
Nγ
β + γ
(8b)
p¯1 − p¯2 = (λ − β)(l2 − l1) (8c)
Similarly, a competitive equilibrium of Type III occurs in weakly inward parking at the boundary between Proﬁles
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No. 17 and 18,
K¯1 =
1
2
Nβ − (β + γ)(l2 − l1)s
β + γ
(9a)
K¯2 = N − 12
Nβ − (β + γ)(l2 − l1)s
β + γ
(9b)
p¯1 − p¯2 = (λ + γ)(l2 − l1) (9c)
Note that the type III competitive equilibrium may not exist if Nβ < (β + γ)(l2 − l1)s.
More importantly, a competitive parking equilibrium of Type IV occurs in hybrid parking at the boundary between
Proﬁles 7 and 9 where,
K1 =
Nβ + s(u2 − u1) − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
(10)
K2 =
Nγ − s(u2 − u1) + s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
(11)
In this case, the competition leads to a situation where the parking fees are priced to be such that each parking cluster
is preferred in a certain time period, i.e., the farther parking cluster is preferred in early arrival, and the closer parking
cluster is preferred in late arrival. Meanwhile, the number of parking spaces built in both clusters are such that a
further increase in the capacity in either cluster will not increase its the market share and proﬁts.
We now turn to solve the Type IV competitive parking equilibrium. Given the equilibrated price of the closer
parking cluster, p¯1, the proﬁt maximization problem of the farther cluster reads,
max
p2
K2(p2 − a2) = max
p2
(
Nβ + s(u2 − u1) − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
(p2 − a2)
)
= max
p2
(
− 2s
β + γ
p22 +
Nγ + 2sp¯1 + 2sa2 − (2λ + γ − β)sΔl
β + γ
p2 +C
)
where C is a term independent of p2. Therefore,
p¯2 = argmaxp2K2(p2 − a2) =
Nγ
4s
− 2λ + γ − β
4
Δl +
p¯1 + a2
2
(12)
and substitute p2 in Equation 11 by p¯2 in Equation 12, we have
K¯2 =
Nγ
2
+ s(p¯1 − a2 − 2λ + γ − β2 Δl)
β + γ
(13)
Similarly, maximizing the proﬁts of the operators who own the closer cluster, given the equilibrated price of the farther
cluster, p¯2, yields,
p¯1 =
Nβ
4s
+
2λ + γ − β
4
Δl +
p¯2 + a1
2
(14)
K¯1 =
Nβ
2
+ s(p¯2 − a1 + 2λ + γ − β2 Δl)
β + γ
(15)
Adding up Equations 13 and 15 should satisfy the market clearing condition,
p¯1 + p¯2 =
N
2s
(β + γ) + a1 + a2 (16)
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Combining Equations 16 and 14 (or 12) solves the competitive equilibrium,
p¯1 =
N
6s
(2β + γ) +
2λ + γ − β
6
Δl +
2a1 + a2
3
(17a)
p¯2 =
N
6s
(β + 2γ) − 2λ + γ − β
6
Δl +
a1 + 2a2
3
(17b)
K¯1 =
N(γ + 2β) + s(2λ + γ − β)Δl − 2s(a1 − a2)
3(β + γ)
(17c)
K¯2 =
N(2γ + β) − s(2λ + γ − β)Δl + 2s(a1 − a2)
3(β + γ)
(17d)
Because the Type IV competitive equilibrium is the result of hybrid parking, (λ − β)Δl < (p¯1 − p¯2) < (λ + γ)Δl. It
exists only if
N
2s
(γ − β) − (γ + 2β − λ)Δl < a1 − a2 < N2s (γ − β) + (2γ + β + λ)Δl (18)
In other words, if the diﬀerence in the investment cost between the two clusters is too small or too large, Type IV
equilibrium will not exist. This is somewhat expected. An extremely high investment cost in the farther cluster can
lead to a high parking price set by those operators (as a result of Equation 12). When the farther cluster is overpriced,
travelers are not willing to use the farther parking spaces and consequently the parking preference becomes outward,
which destroys the equilibrium. On the other hand, if those operators who own the farther cluster set a lower price
so that they do make some proﬁts (still under hybrid parking) but the proﬁts are not maximized, they can increase
the parking fee to make more proﬁts. This, however, place them into the risk of losing their market share because
a fee increase beyond a certain threshold can eventually change travelers’ parking preference. In this sense, such a
Type IV competitive equilibrium may not be reachable and the parking market may be unstable in terms of parking
prices and capacity allocations. The same logic applies to the case where the operators who own the closer cluster
are subject to an extremely high investment cost. In both cases where a Type IV equilibrium is not stable, regulations
can be used to create a stable market in the manner of, for instance, restricting the parking fee or capacity of both
clusters. This can ensure the private operators in both clusters earn reasonable proﬁts in a stable parking market. More
importantly, market regulation may help further increase the system performance and reduce congestion than what
would be achieved if the market is left alone, as will be discussed later.
4.2. Stability of the equilibria
There are in all four types of competitive parking equilibrium. Not all of them, however, are stable. We examine
them here one by one.
The Type II and Type III equilibrium occurs when the parking preference is weakly outward or weakly inward,
and the two types of preference only hold when Δp equals a single real value, i.e. Δp = (λ − β)Δl or Δp = (λ + γ)Δl.
Such equilibria are obviously not stable because a slight price change in either parking cluster can result in a change
in parking preference and thus completely changes the travel proﬁle and market shares. Both types of competitive
equilibrium are unlikely to occur in reality since their traﬃc patterns are unstable.
Type I occurs where p¯1 = (λ − β)Δl. This type of equilibrium is theoretically stable in the sense that the operators
in the closer cluster can set a reasonable price and build N spaces such that they attract all the commuters and locally
maximizes their proﬁts, no matter how the farther cluster lowers its price or changes its capacity. However, Type I
may not exist (or sometimes may not be stable/desired) in a practical sense for the following reasons: 1) The ﬁxed
investment cost per parking space is normally high in the closer cluster. It is very likely that p¯1 = (λ − β)Δl < a1.
Under this condition the operators in the closer cluster make no proﬁt. To make a proﬁt they have to increase the
parking fee, but this destroys the Type I equilibrium; 2) Even if p¯1 = (λ − β)Δl > a1 and the operators in the closer
cluster can make proﬁts by setting a low price and achieving Type I equilibrium, the proﬁts they make under Type I
(since locally maximized) may be less than what they can make under a Type IV equilibrium in which they can charge
a substantially higher price, and a smaller market share. Therefore, a Type IV equilibrium is more desirable; and 3)
now we only consider the case where Δl is ﬁxed in the short run. In reality, if the farther parking cluster manages to
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improve its accessibility in the long run, it can easily destroy the Type I equilibrium to get a market share, which leads
to fundamentally diﬀerent ﬂow patterns. Type I equilibrium, therefore, is unlikely to occur in practice.
The Type IV competitive parking equilibrium is stable both in theory and in practice, because its travel preference
and proﬁle exists under a broad range of prices and capacities, and it oﬀers the opportunity for operators in both
clusters to make a proﬁt. Since this type of equilibria is most likely to occur in practice, we focus on the analysis of
the Type IV equilibrium in the rest of the paper.
5. The Type IV competitive parking equilibrium
In this section, we examine in detail the properties of the Type IV equilibrium from several perspectives: market
share, proﬁts, and system performance.
5.1. Market share, proﬁts and travel proﬁle
As can be seen from Equation 17, given the attributes of the commuter population (i.e. β, λ, γ) and travel demand
N, improving the accessibility of parking lots (i.e., reducing the “access time”) is desired for both parking clusters
since a shorter access time in one cluster can, holding the access time of the other cluster constant, increase both its
market share and equilibrated parking fee, hence its proﬁt. Therefore, the private operators in both clusters have the
incentive to reduce their access times through providing frequent shuttle bus services or other means.
As for the investment cost, a higher investment cost of one cluster can lead to a smaller market share and proﬁt for
this cluster, but higher proﬁt for the other cluster. Therefore, private operators in both clusters have the incentive to
reduce their investment costs. In addition, an increase in the investment cost of one cluster indeed can lead to higher
parking fees for both clusters, which does not favor travelers. This is because the operators in this cluster have to
raise the parking price to pay oﬀ a higher investment cost, and therefore the competitors will also raise their parking
fee, however not as much as the former (by a half of the increased fee of the former to be exact), which is proven to
enlarge their market shares and proﬁts.
We plot the travel proﬁle of the Type IV equilibrium in Figure 2 before we show several of its features.
Figure 2: The travel proﬁle under Type IV competitive equilibrium
This proﬁle is actually a special case of both Proﬁles No. 7 and 9 (Qian and Zhang, 2009). As discussed before,
in hybrid parking, a traveler who departs at such a time that he arrives earlier than t∗ using either cluster prefers the
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farther parking cluster due to v1 > v2, while a traveler who departs at such a time that he arrives later than t∗ using
either cluster prefers the closer one, due to u1 < u2. However, some travelers may depart the bottleneck in such a
time that they are subject to early arrival if choosing the closer cluster, and late arrival if choosing the farther cluster.
For those travelers, there exists a transition period (i.e. the time period from D to B on the departure curve from the
bottleneck) during which travelers’ parking preference switches gradually from the farther cluster to the closer one.
The traveler who departs home at time tA (the departure time of the traveler marked by A in the proﬁle) is indiﬀerent to
both clusters and y¯ = u2−u1
β+γ
, and the travel proﬁle under competitive market equilibrium is such that this exact traveler
ﬁlls up the farther parking cluster. As can be seen from the proﬁle, during the morning commute, the queue at the
bottleneck has two peaks. The ﬁrst peak is due to the demand for parking at the farther cluster when it is preferred,
while the second one is caused by those travelers parking at the closer cluster when the preference on the farther
cluster is later transferred to the closer one.
The travel pattern achieved under the competitive equilibrium indicates that compared to the morning commute
without parking choices, a parking market has the ability to mitigate the congestion in the middle of the rush hour,
i.e. ACEF in Figure 2 is the queuing delay saved by such a competition between parking clusters. While it may not
necessarily reduce the schedule delay cost (as the departure curve from the bottleneck can move along the time axle
within a certain range, dependent on the value of y¯), it can always reduce the queuing delay. Incorporating parking
choices in the morning commute essentially distinguishes travelers in groups such that each group of commuters will
travel within a certain time period diﬀerent from others, and hence the queue can be shortened without necessarily
reducing the travel demand nor spreading the peak time. This has the same eﬀect as tolling travelers selectively. In
the latter, each of the travelers is charged a toll in a fraction of working days so as to change travelers’ departure times
(Daganzo and Garcia, 2000). However, using parking choices to distinguish travelers during the morning commute
may be less controversial since travelers can change their own departure times voluntarily in a parking market, rather
than being selected to be tolled in certain days.
5.2. Total travel cost and total queuing delay
Now we compute the total travel cost and total queuing delay of a Type IV equilibrium, and compare them to
the case where all travelers use either the closer or farther cluster. Let TCC (TSC), TCCo,1 (TSCo,1) and TCCo,2
(TSCo,2) denote the total commuter cost (total system cost) under the Type IV equilibrium and the cases without
parking choices where all travelers use parking cluster 1 or 2, respectively.
Under the travel proﬁle as shown in Figure 2, if the parking fees of the two clusters are set to be p1 and p2 and
Equation 10 and 11 hold, then the total commuter travel cost is2,
TCC =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 +
N
β + γ
(βp1 + γp2 − β(λ + γ)Δl) (19)
=
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 +
N
β + γ
(βp1 + γp2 + γ(λ − β)Δl)
and the total system cost is,
TSC =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 − N
β + γ
β(λ + γ)Δl + a1K1 + a2K2 − Δps(2y¯ − Δl) (20)
=
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 +
N
β + γ
γ(λ − β)Δl + a1K1 + a2K2 − Δps(2y¯ − Δl)
where K1 and K2 are determined by Equation 10 and 11, and
y¯ =
(λ + γ)Δl − (p1 − p2)
β + γ
2We ﬁrst solve the geometry of the proﬁle and then compute the TCC and TSC. The derivation is fairly lengthy and is omitted here.
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Since the parking market reaches a competitive equilibrium such that p¯1, K¯1 and p¯2, K¯2 can be represented by Equation
17, then,
TCC =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 +
N
β + γ
(βp¯1 + γ p¯2 − β(λ + γ)Δl) (21)
=
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 +
N
β + γ
(βp¯1 + γ p¯2 + γ(λ − β)Δl)
TSC =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 − N
β + γ
β(λ + γ)Δl + a1K¯1 + a2K¯2 − Δp¯s(2y¯ − Δl) (22)
=
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 +
N
β + γ
γ(λ − β)Δl + a1K¯1 + a2K¯2 − Δp¯s(2y¯ − Δl)
If all the travelers use either the closer or the farther cluster, then,
TCCo,1 =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 + Npo,1
TCCo,2 =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 + Npo,2
TSCo,1 =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 + Na1
TSCo,2 =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 + Na2
Due to monopoly, the parking fee charged by the monopolistic cluster is usually higher than what is achieved under
the competitive market equilibrium, i.e. po,1 ≥ p¯1 and po,2 ≥ p¯2. It is easy to verify that TCC < TCCo,1 and
TCC < TCCo,2 given the required condition of hybrid parking, i.e. (λ − β)Δl < p¯1 − p¯2 < (λ + γ)Δl. However, the
sign of TSC − TSCo,1 (or TSC − TSCo,2) is actually undetermined, and depends on the values of the parameters,
such as the access times and investment costs. This implies that such a competitive equilibrium, naturally, can reduce
the commuter travel cost compared to the case where all travelers use the same parking cluster, due to the competition
among private parking operators. But it does not necessarily reduce the total social cost. Therefore, a competitive
parking market, under certain conditions can lead to an undesirable market outcome.
We already show graphically that the competitive equilibrium can reduce the queuing delay as compared to the
typical morning commute problem without parking choices. Let TD and TDo denote the total queuing delay under
the Type IV competitive equilibrium and the typical morning commute problem, respectively. Under the travel proﬁle
shown in Figure 2, if the parking fees of the two clusters are set to be p1 and p2, then the queuing delay is,
TD =
N2γβ
2αs(β + γ)
− y¯(Δl − y¯) s
α
(β + γ) (23)
where y¯ =
(λ + γ)Δl − (p1 − p2)
β + γ
TDo =
N2γβ
2αs(β + γ)
Therefore, when a Type IV equilibrium is achieved,
TD − TDo = −y¯(Δl − y¯) s
α
(β + γ) < 0 (24)
Given the access times of both clusters, Δl, we show that the parking fees that minimize the queuing delay, denoted
by Δp∗∗, are such that y¯ = 12Δl, i.e.
Δp∗∗ =
2λ + γ − β
2
Δl (25)
This can serve as one of the targeted parking prices for a regulatory agency in order to achieve minimum queuing
delay.
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5.3. The eﬀects of investment cost, parking fee and access time
Now we perform a sensitivity analysis to study how changes in parking fee, access time and investment cost aﬀect
TSC, TCC and TD. The derivatives of TSC, TCC and TD with respect to all three factors are shown in Appendix
B. First we examine the eﬀect of investment cost. The investment cost, including the real estate value/tax and
maintenance cost, may be adjusted by both the private operators and the public regulator. Because
dTCC
da2
>
dTCC
da1
> 0
lowering the investment cost per parking space in either parking cluster can always reduce the commuter travel cost as
it reduces the parking fee, and it seems such a reduction in investment cost in the farther cluster can be more eﬃcient
than it is in the closer cluster. However, reductions in the investment cost may not necessarily reduce both the total
system cost and queuing delay. This is because the savings in operators’ cost may not pay oﬀ the increase in the
queuing delay or schedule delay cost that travelers are subject to.
When the diﬀerence of parking fee between the two clusters is not large (i.e. 2Δ p¯ < (2λ + γ − β)Δl), the regulator
can set a higher investment cost in the central cluster or lower it in the outer cluster in order to reduce the queuing
delay. On the other hand, a higher investment cost in the central area or a lower cost in the outer area can lead to less
total social cost only if the diﬀerence of investment cost is suﬃciently large. In other words, to achieve a better system
performance, the regulator should consider enlarging the diﬀerence of investment cost only if it indeed already makes
suﬃciently large diﬀerence.
Now we examine the eﬀect of access time. Whether or not reducing access time of the farther parking cluster can
beneﬁt the commuter cost is dependent on the population attributes, i.e. β, γ, λ. In addition, under a certain condition,
shortening the access time may not necessarily reduce the queuing delay nor the system cost: the outcome depends on
not only the population attributes but also some other parameters, such as total demandN and the bottleneck capacity
s. Therefore, under the Type IV equilibrium, improving the accessibility of the parking lots may not beneﬁt the
commuters nor the entire system, but it would beneﬁt some parking operators because lowering access times can
attract more customers and bring in higher proﬁts.
Finally, by diﬀerentiating Equation 19 with respect to p1 and p2, we have,
∂TCC
∂p1
> 0,
∂TCC
∂p2
> 0 (26)
implying that reducing the parking fee in both clusters under the Type IV competitive equilibrium can always beneﬁt
commuters. While if the diﬀerence of parking fee between the two clusters is suﬃciently high, then reducing the
parking fee of the farther cluster (and hence also the diﬀerence of parking fee) can beneﬁt the overall system. If the
market is regulated, a regulator can require one cluster to reduce its parking fee, then the other cluster will also lower
its price in order to remain competitive. This results in a lower cost for commuters but probably less proﬁts for parking
operators (as we can see later), and can beneﬁt the entire system under certain conditions.
To summarize, a parking market can result in less queuing delay than the morning commute without parking
choices. However, a parking market without regulation can lead to a market equilibrium where the total system cost
and commuter cost are higher than the case without parking choices and can be further reduced. This can be remedied
through market regulation, such as a price ceiling or capacity ﬂoor, as we shall discuss in the next section. It is worth
noting that reducing the access times of both clusters may not beneﬁt the travelers in terms their travel costs, but can
bring more proﬁts to the operators.
6. The regulated parking market
Since the competitive parking equilibrium may not produce the best market outcome, we explore in this section
how market regulation can be used to improve the market outcome in terms of total cost and congestion. Several types
of regulations will be discussed, they include price-ceiling, capacity-ﬂoor or ceiling, quantity tax or subsidy. Each
of these regulations is introduced to achieve the following objectives: 1) reduce the total system cost; 2) reduce the
queuing delay (i.e. network congestion); 3) reduce the commuters’ total cost (or equivalently, commuters’ individual
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travel cost), particularly the parking fee; and 4) maintain a certain level of proﬁtability for the private operators. The
resultant total cost and queuing delay are expected to be reduced compared to the following two cases, 1) the morning
commute without parking choices (i.e. the typical morning commute problem) and 2) competitive equilibrium without
regulation.
6.1. The price-ceiling regulation
As shown in the previous section, a price-ceiling applied to the farther parking cluster can reduce the parking fees
of both clusters, and consequently the total commuter travel cost. It can also ensure a stable market when a competitive
equilibrium does not exist. Suppose that a regulator sets a price ceiling, p′2, for the farther cluster, we have
p2 ≤ p′2 (27)
Let p¯1,c, p¯2,c and K¯1,c, K¯2,c denote the parking fee and capacity allocation of the closer and farther cluster under the
Type IV competitive market equilibrium with the price-ceiling regulation, respectively. Given the equilibrated price
of the closer cluster, p¯1,c, the proﬁt maximization problem for the farther cluster reads,
max
p2∈[0,p′2]
K2(p2 − a2) = max
p2∈[0,p′2]
(
− 2s
β + γ
p22 +
Nγ + 2sp¯1,c + 2sa2 − (2λ + γ − β)sΔl
β + γ
p2 +C
)
where C is a term independent of p2. In order to let such a p′2 take eﬀect in reducing the equilibrated price on the
farther cluster, we have
p′2 < p¯2 =
N
6s
(β + 2γ) − 2λ + γ − β
6
Δl +
a1 + 2a2
3
(28)
Therefore,
p¯2,c = argmaxp2∈[0,p′2]K2(p2 − a2) = p′2 (29)
K¯2,c =
Nγ +
Nβ
2
− s(p′2 +
2λ + γ − β
2
Δl − a1)
β + γ
(30)
Similarly, maximizing the proﬁts of private operators in the closer cluster, given the equilibrated price of the
farther cluster, p′2, yields,
p¯1,c =
Nβ
4s
+
2λ + γ − β
4
Δl +
p′2 + a1
2
(31)
K¯1,c =
Nβ
2
+ s(p′2 +
2λ + γ − β
2
Δl − a1)
β + γ
(32)
and the condition of market clearing is satisﬁed. Because such an equilibrium only exists in hybrid parking, i.e.
(λ − β)Δl < p¯1,c − p¯2,c < (λ + γ)Δl, we solve for p′2 by combing Equation 31 and 29, which yields
Nβ
2s
− Δl
2
(2λ + 3γ + β) + a1 < p′2 <
Nβ
2s
+
Δl
2
(γ − 2λ + 3β) + a1 (33)
Inequality 28 and 33 altogether determine an appropriate range for p′2 that the regulator can choose from. If p
′
2 is out
of this range, the market does not attain a stable equilibrium, or the regulation may not take eﬀect.
Compared to the unregulated parking market, in the market with the price-ceiling regulation, private operators in
the closer cluster also lower their parking fee in order to compete with the farther cluster. Although the closer parking
cluster now has a higher market share, its operators make less proﬁts than in the unregulated market. To see this, we
note that
∂maxK1(p1 − a1)
∂p2
= − s
β + γ
(p2 − Nβ2s − a1 −
2λ + γ − β
4
Δl)
∂maxK1(p1 − a1)
∂p2
|p2=p′2 > 0 due to Inequality 33.
∂maxK1(p1 − a1)
∂p2
|p2=p¯2 > 0 due to Equality 12.
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As a consequence, the farther parking cluster has a smaller market share with a lower parking fee, and therefore also
earns less proﬁts.
Because the competitive parking equilibrium under the price-ceiling regulation is achieved under the same proﬁle
type (i.e. Figure 2) as in the unregulated market, we can compute the total commuter cost using Equation 19 and total
system cost using Equation 20,
TCCc =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 +
N
β + γ
(βp¯1,c + γ p¯2,c − β(λ + γ)Δl) (34)
TSCc =
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 − N
β + γ
β(λ + γ)Δl + a1K¯1,c + a2K¯2,c − Δpcs(2y¯c − Δl)
From this we can obtain the derivatives of the total cost with respect to the price bound and access time as follows:
dTCCc
dp′2
=
N
β + γ
(
1
2
β + γ
)
> 0
dTSCc
dp′2
=
s
β + γ
(p′2 − a2) −
Nβ
2(β + γ)
As long as the price ceiling p′2 is set to be such that the competitive parking equilibrium still exists, the regulator
may want to lower the ceiling as this can always reduce the total commuter cost. If the net proﬁt per parking space
for the farther cluster is beyond a threshold (i.e. Nβ2s ), then a lower p
′
2 is also desirable from the system point of view.
A lower pricing ceiling p′2 can also reduce both the commuters’ individual travel costs and parking charge (in both
clusters). However, the ceiling may not be set too low because, 1) a low ceiling p′2 does not necessarily produce less
queuing delay than a high ceiling; 2) a low ceiling p′2 can squeeze the proﬁts of operators in both clusters and in fact
result in a higher total system cost; and 3) the ceiling has a lower bound given by Equation 33. Although p′2 can be set
to be asymptotically approaching the lower bound or Nβ2s + a2 to further reduce the total travel cost, whichever comes
smaller. Such a minimum cannot be achieved due to the discontinuity of the travel proﬁle at the lower bound. The
price ceiling regulation transfers the beneﬁts from operators to commuters through a lower parking fees rather than
less queuing delay. Hence a too low price bound may not be desirable if the regulator’s objective is to use it to manage
traﬃc congestion.
We show that dTDcdp′2 can take any sign. Therefore, the price-ceiling regulation may not necessarily reduce the total
queuing delay as compared to the case without regulation. However, we can set a p′∗∗2 to minimize the queuing delay.
Such an optimal price bound can be obtained by combining Equation 29, 31 and 25,
p′∗∗2 = a1 +
Nβ
2s
− 2λ + γ − β
2
Δl (35)
p′∗∗2 satisﬁes Inequality 33 but may or may not satisfy Inequality 28. Therefore, it is possible that such a minimum-
queuing-delay inducing bound may not exist in some cases.
6.2. The capacity-ﬂoor or capacity-ceiling regulation
Since the price-ceiling regulation can eﬃciently reduce the social cost and commuter cost, and ensure a stable
parking market, a question naturally arises, can a capacity-ﬂoor or capacity-ceiling regulation achieve the same goal?
First, the capacity-ceiling regulation will not work. This is because if a cluster is regulated to build a certain
number of spaces that must not exceed such a “ceiling”, then the operators in the other cluster can increase the
parking price as much as possible to maximize their proﬁts. This may lead to an unreasonably high parking fee in the
other cluster and market failure.
On the other hand, a capacity-ﬂoor regulation sets a minimum number of parking spaces for a cluster, e.g. K2 ≥ K′2.
We would expect the competitive equilibrium (hopefully with less total travel cost) achieves when the regulation takes
eﬀect, i.e., the equilibrated capacity K¯2,c f = K′2. However, if K
′
2 ≤ K¯2, then the equilibrium with the capacity-ﬂoor
regulation still achieves at K¯2 so it does not take eﬀect. If otherwise K′2 > K¯2, then the equilibrium is such that only
K¯2 spaces will be used by commuters and the eﬀective equilibrated capacity is still K¯2. Therefore, the capacity-ﬂoor
regulation does not work either.
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Unfortunately, restriction on only the capacity of parking clusters seems not eﬀective or sometimes unnecessary.
This is essentially because the regulator can only inﬂuence the actual parking capacities, rather than the eﬀective
parking capacities, while the competitive equilibrium determines the eﬀective parking capacities, not the actual one.
6.3. The quantity tax/subsidy regulation
In addition to the price-ceiling regulation, taxation may also be an option for the public regulator to adopt in
pursuit of a desired market outcome. A tax/subsidy can sometimes be more eﬃcient than the price-ceiling regulation
as the tax collected can be re-distributed to the public, or the subsidy paid to the private operators can reduce the
deadweight loss. We note that a lump-sum tax or subsidy imposed on operators in either of the two parking clusters
does not change the parking fee and capacity allocation at the competitive equilibrium.
Suppose the regulator imposes a quantity tax/subsidy π1 and π2 per space (per vehicle) on the closer and farther
parking clusters, respectively. If the tax/subsidy is set in favor of the farther cluster, then π1 > π2 > 0 in the case of
a tax, and π2 < π1 < 0 in the case of a subsidy. When the tax/subsidy is set in favor of the closer cluster, then π1
and π2 exchange their positions in the above inequalities. A quantity tax/subsidy scheme is equivalent to changing
investment costs under the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, by replacing a1 with a1 + π1 and a2 with a2 + π2 in
Equation 17, we have (let the subscript “t” to represent the case of the quantity tax regulation),
p¯1,t = p¯1 +
2π1 + π2
3
(36a)
p¯2,t = p¯2 +
π1 + 2π2
3
(36b)
K¯1,t = K¯1 − 2s3(β + γ) (π1 − π2) (36c)
K¯2,t = K¯2 +
2s
3(β + γ)
(π1 − π2) (36d)
Also, such an equilibrium must satisfy the condition for hybrid parking, i.e., (λ − β)Δl < p¯1 − p¯2 < (λ + γ)Δl. We
have,
N
2s
(γ − β) − (γ + 2β − λ)Δl − (a1 − a2) < π1 − π2 < N2s (γ − β) + (2γ + β + λ)Δl − (a1 − a2) (37)
Now we can compare this new equilibrium under the tax/subsidy regulation with the competitive market equilib-
rium without regulation. Let us ﬁrst consider a quantity tax/subsidy regulation in favor of the farther cluster, π1 > π2.
By introducing a quantity tax (subsidy), the equilibrated parking prices in the closer cluster and the farther cluster
increase (decrease) by 2π1+π23 and
π1+2π2
3 , respectively. The closer parking cluster will have a smaller market share and
some commuters may switch to use the farther one. Both operators increase their prices to transfer the regulatory tax
to their customers, or both operators reduce their prices to compete for more customers and some of the beneﬁts of
the subsidy will also be transferred to the commuters. The proﬁtable parking fee exclusive of tax/subsidy, p2 − π2,
in the farther cluster actually increases by π1−π23 . Since its market share also increase, its operators earn more proﬁts
than the case without regulation. However, such a taxation/subsidy reduces both the market share and the parking fee
of the closer cluster, and the private operators in the closer cluster are made worse oﬀ by this regulation. Therefore,
a tax/subsidy in favor of the farther (closer) cluster can eﬃciently reduce (increase) traﬃc demand to the central city
(CBD). Additionally, as indicated by Equation 37, the tax/subsidy must be appropriately set in order to ensure the
existence of the competitive equilibrium (also a stable parking market).
According to the derivatives of TSC, TCC and TD with respective to a1 and a2, we show that a tax in either
of the clusters can increase the parking fee, which essentially increase the commuter travel cost, while a subsidy in
contrast can beneﬁts commuters. If the diﬀerence of the investment cost between the two clusters is signiﬁcant, then
the regulator should set a quantity tax/subsidy that favors the farther cluster, i.e. π1 > π2, to produce a lower total
system cost than in the unregulated parking market. Not only does such a regulation tend to balance the proﬁts of both
clusters in the market, it also can reduce the total system travel cost. In contrast, if the diﬀerence of the investment cost
between the two clusters is insigniﬁcant, and hence the farther cluster has a more advantageous investment cost than
a certain threshold, then the regulator should tax (or subsidize) the closer cluster less (or more) heavily, i.e. π1 < π2.
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We also obtain a Δπ∗∗ that minimizes the queuing delay and in the same time guarantees less congestion than the
case without regulation (given Δl) by combining Equations 36a, 36b and 25,
Δπ∗∗ =
N
2s
(γ − β) + 2λ + γ − β
2
Δl − (a1 − a2) (38)
Any setting of tax/subsidy towards Δπ∗∗ is desirable in terms of reduced congestion. Because Δπ∗∗ satisﬁes Inequality
37, such a tax/subsidy can always be achieved, but it normally does not entail a minimum total social/commuter cost.
Finally, from the travelers’ perspective, a subsidy to the operators can reduce the parking fees of both clusters in
addition to its capability of reducing total commuter (individual) travel cost, whereas a tax in contrast increase the
parking fees. Thus, though both a subsidy and a tax may be able to achieve a better market outcome in terms of total
commuter/social cost, a subsidy may be more preferred by the commuters more than a tax.
7. Numerical examples
In this section we present numerical examples of competitive market equilibrium under realistic network param-
eters, and show how a price-ceiling regulation and quantity tax regulation can inﬂuence the parking market, social
welfare and the network congestion.
The basic model parameters are as follows: a total demand of N = 10, 000 vehicles commute in the morning rush
hour and go through a freeway bottleneck with capacity s = 120 veh/min (approximately a six-lane freeway with
three lanes per direction). α = $10/hour, β = $4/hour, γ = $20/hour are set to be consistent with the literature.
We assume λ = $15/hour. The central parking cluster is fairly convenient and it only takes 2 minutes on average
to reach the oﬃce from the parking space, while the farther parking cluster is about 20 minutes away from the
oﬃce. Suppose the investment cost of the closer cluster and the farther one is a1 = $10/commuting peak/space
and a2 = $1/commuting peak/space respectively. In order to have a stable competitive equilibrium in cases with or
without regulations, (λ − β)Δl < Δp < (λ + γ)Δl (i.e., 3.3$ < Δp < 10.5$).
First we solve the competitive market equilibrium without regulation. The equilibrated parking price of the closer
cluster and the farther cluster is $15.8 and $11.9, respectively. Under such an equilibrium, the closer cluster is used by
3,469 travelers, and the rest 6,531 travelers use the farther one. The total travel cost is $204,142, and the total queuing
delay cost of the network is $2,196. The resultant queuing delay cost is less than the queuing delay cost of the case
without parking choices, $2,315, by around 5%. As a matter of fact, if no regulation is imposed to the parking market,
the parking price can be surprisingly higher than what travelers can accept in practice. Overall, such a market may
under-provide parking services. In order to further reduce the total travel cost and queuing delay, and preferably the
parking fee as well, a regulator may introduce into the market a price-ceiling or a quantity tax/subsidy regulation.
Figure 3 gives the changes in parking prices, capacity, proﬁts, total travel cost and queuing delay with respect to
the price ceiling p′2. Inequality 28 and 33 gives that $1 < p
′
2 < $11.9 to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. When
the price ceiling decreases so that the parking fee of the farther cluster changes from $11.8 to $1.1, the number of
travelers using the closer cluster reduces from 3,469 to nearly only 200, its parking fee from $15.8 to $10.2, and its
proﬁts from $19,761 to $91. Meanwhile, although the farther cluster tends to dominate the parking market with the
decrease of the price ceiling, its proﬁts also reduce from $70,812 to nearly $976 due to the decreasing parking fee.
Therefore, as proved in previous sections, the proﬁts of private operators in both clusters are squeezed due to the price
ceiling. However, from the system point of view, the price-ceiling regulation is very promising. It can reduce the total
travel cost, compared to the unregulated market, by up to 10% at a $3.78 price ceiling. It reduces total commuter
cost by nearly half when the price ceiling is $1.1 and by a quarter when it is $6.2. In addition, the congestion is also
mitigated. When the ceiling is $5.88, the congestion is minimized with a reduction in delay by 58%. Therefore, the
regulatory agency may want to ﬁrst set a price ceiling ranging from $1.1 to $5.88 for the farther cluster, then choose
a ceiling based on the tradeoﬀs between social/commuter cost and congestion.
We also plot in Figure 4 the changes in parking prices, capacity, proﬁts of both clusters, total cost and queuing
delay with respect to a quantity tax/subsidy. Without loss of generality, we assume the regulator only charges a tax
to or subsidizes travelers of the farther cluster. Inequality 37 gives that −$19.2 < π2 < $1.87 to ensure the existence
of a competitive market equilibrium. A tax charged on the farther cluster favors the closer cluster, while a subsidy
favors the farther cluster. Overall, by reducing the tax on the farther cluster from $1.8 to zero, and further subsidizing
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Figure 3: The changes in parking prices, capacity allocations, proﬁts, TSC, TCC and TD in a regulated market with respect to a price ceiling
travelers from zero up to $10, the farther cluster tends to dominate the market. However, it makes the operators in the
farther cluster gain proﬁts (unlike the price-ceiling regulation) while the closer cluster loses proﬁts. Unfortunately, it
is unable to reduce the total travel cost eﬀectively. When a $1.2 tax is charged on the farther cluster, the reduction in
the total commuter cost achieves the maximum, but by merely $221 (around 1.1%). Meanwhile, tax on the farther
cluster can yield up to 8% reduction in the system cost. When a subsidy is oﬀered, it always increases both the total
system cost (by up to 80%) and commuter cost (by up to 12%), which is not desired from the public’s perspective.
Although a quantity tax/subsidy is unable to eﬀectively reduce the social cost, the subsidy can mitigate congestion
compared to the case of no regulation. The queuing delay can be reduced up to approximately the same amount as in
the price-ceiling regulation. Consequently, under a subsidy (to the farther cluster), travelers can suﬀer less congestion
and pay lower parking fee with, however, a considerably higher schedule delay cost.
To sum up, in our numerical example, the price-ceiling regulation overall outperforms, in terms of market ef-
ﬁciency, the quantity tax/subsidy regulation in this experiment. The price-ceiling regulation favors travelers over
private operators, while the quantity tax/subsity regulation favors some operators over the travelers who will pay a
higher travel cost under this regulation. Even when it oﬀers reduction in the social cost, the latter regulation may
not be welcome by the traveling public because a tax is charged on the farther cluster will raise the parking fee and
queuing delay cost substantially while it reduces the travel cost only slightly3.
3Note that the quantity tax/subsidy may eﬀectively reduce the total travel cost in other cases, dependent on the network parameters, such as total
demand, population attributes and so forth
646  Zhen (Sean) Qian et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 628–649
Figure 4: The changes in parking prices, capacity allocations, proﬁts, TSC, TCC and TD in the regulated market with respect to a quantity
tax/subsidy
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we study a competitive parking market for the morning commute where all the parking lots are
privately owned. The parking lots are abstracted to a closer parking cluster and a farther one. The parking capacity
allocations and parking fees are determined by a competitive parking market.
We ﬁrst derived the competitive equilibrium for a parking market. There are in all four types of competitive market
equilibrium and only one is proven to be stable, but its existence is not always guaranteed. The stable competitive
market equilibrium can yield less total commuter cost and less queuing delay than the case without parking choices,
but not necessarily less total social cost. Our sensitivity analysis indicates that the reduction of access times of
the parking lots beneﬁts private operators, but does not necessarily reduce the total system cost and congestion. In
addition, lowering the investment cost per parking space in either parking cluster can always reduce the commuter
travel cost as it reduces the parking fees. To achieve a better system performance, the regulator should consider raising
the investment cost of the closer cluster only if there is suﬃciently large diﬀerence in the investment costs between
the two clusters.
Overall, we showed that both total commuter/social cost and queuing delay can be further reduced by introducing
regulations on the market, and the regulations can also be used to ensure a stable parking market, to inﬂuence the
market in favor of the commuters and to balance the proﬁts of private operators.
We considered three types of market regulation, price-ceiling, capacity-ﬂoor or capacity-ceiling and quantity
tax/subsidy to ensure market stability, improve market outcome, and balance the interests of operators and the traveling
public. The price-ceiling regulation looks promising as it can eﬀectively reduce the total commuter cost as compared
to no regulation, and the lower the pricing ceiling is, the lower the total commuter cost it achieves. Although the price
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ceiling regulation does not necessarily reduce traﬃc congestion when it is compared to the case of no regulation, we
showed that there always exists a range of the ceiling where queuing delay is reduced. Under such a price-ceiling
regulation, improvement of accessibility of the farther cluster is always desirable from both the regulator’s and private
operators’ perspective. In addition, since it can reduce travelers’ individual travel cost and the parking fees charged by
both parking clusters, it is also desirable from the travelers’s perspective. However, the price-ceiling regulation always
squeezes the private operators’ proﬁts. Unlike the price-ceiling regulation, a quantity tax/subsidy always favors one
parking cluster over the other. It may be able to reduce the total commuter/social cost, and the queuing delay when the
tax/subsidy is set in a certain range. Compared to taxation, travelers may favor a subsidy scheme since it can reduce
the parking fees charged by both clusters.
While the proposed model answers some basic questions on how a competitive parking market operates, how it
aﬀects the morning commute patterns, and how regulations can be used to achieve a certain market outcome, it made
many simplifying assumptions that we hope to address in our future research. These include,
• We did not consider commuters’ time spent on searching for parking spaces. The search for available parking
spaces constitutes a wasteful commuting component that contributes to congestion. Future work should take
into account the search time into travelers’s commute cost.
• In the real world, parking is supplied by both private ﬁrms and public entities. It would be interesting to study
this mixed market and compare it with the two extreme cases of either private-only or public-only parking
provision.
• It would be of particular interest to extend this model to consider other traﬃc modes, for instance transit.
Travelers may be able to avoid the congestion at the bottleneck by taking transit at park-and-ride stations. A
combination of transit fares and parking fees can be used to achieve a desired market outcome.
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Appendix A. 20 possible travel proﬁles
There are in all 20 possible travel patterns, and we derived the total travel cost (TCC) of each proﬁle with the
required condition as shown in Table A.1. In all ﬁve types of parking preference, if K1 = 0,K2 = N (K2 = 0,K1 = N),
then the proﬁle and its TCC are shown in the row of “other” in the table.
Appendix B. Sensitivity analysis of investment cost, parking fee and access time
Here, we derive the derivatives of TSC, TCC and TD under Type IV competitive equilibrium with respect to the
investment cost, parking fee and access time, respectively.
By Equation 17 and 24, we have (let Δ p¯ = p¯1 − p¯2),
dTCC
da1
=
∂TCC
∂p¯1
∂p¯1
∂a1
+
∂TCC
∂p¯2
∂p¯2
∂a1
=
N(2β + γ)
3(β + γ)
> 0
dTCC
da2
=
∂TCC
∂p¯1
∂p¯1
∂a2
+
∂TCC
∂p¯2
∂p¯2
∂a2
=
N(β + 2γ)
3(β + γ)
> 0
Similarly,
dTSC
da1
=
−8s(a1 − a2) + N(8β + γ) + 4sΔl(2λ + γ − β)
9(β + γ)
dTSC
da2
=
16s(a1 − a2) + N(5β + 4γ) − 2sΔl(2λ + γ − β)
9(β + γ)
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Table A.1: An overview: 20 travel proﬁles and TCCs for ﬁve types of parking preference
Parking
prefer-
ence
Condition Total travel cost
Proﬁle
type
0 ≤ K1 ≤ s(v2 − v1)
β
Nβγ
s
N − K1
β + γ
+ λl2N + Np2 1
Outward
s(v2 − v1)
β
≤ K1 ≤ s(v2 − v1) + Nγ
β + γ
2
(strong)
s(v2 − v1) + Nγ
β + γ
≤ K1 ≤ s(u2 − u1) + Nγ
β + γ
Nβ
s
s(u2 − u1) + Nγ
β + γ
+ λNl1 + Np1 3
N > K1 ≥ s(u2 − u1) + Nγ
β + γ
4
0 ≤ K2 ≤ 12
s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λl1N + Np1 12
Outward
1
2
s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
≤ K2 ≤ 12
Nγ
β + γ
Nβ
s
2K2 + λl2N + Np2 13
(weak)
u2 − u1
β + γ
s +
1
2
Nγ
β + γ
≤ K1 ≤ N − 12
Nγ
β + γ
14
1
2
Nγ
β + γ
≤ K1 ≤ u2 − u1
β + γ
s +
1
2
Nγ
β + γ
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λl2N + Np2 15
0 ≤ K1 ≤ 12
Nγ
β + γ
16
0 ≤ K2 ≤ s(v1 − v2)
β
Nβγ
s
N − K2
β + γ
+ λl1N + Np1 5
Inward
s(v1 − v2)
β
≤ K2 ≤ s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
6
(strong)
s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
≤ K2 ≤ s(v1 − v2) + Nγ
β + γ
Nβ
s
s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
+ λNl2 + Np2 7
N > K2 ≥ s(v1 − v2) + Nγ
β + γ
8
0 ≤ K2 ≤ s(v1 − v2)
β
Nβγ
s
N − K2
β + γ
+ λl1N + Np1 5
Inward
s(v1 − v2)
β
≤ K2 ≤ Nγ
β + γ
6
(weak)
Nγ
β + γ
≤ K2 ≤ Nγ + s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 + Np2 7
Nγ + s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
≤ K2 ≤ N − 12
Nβ − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
17
0 ≤ K1 ≤ 12
Nβ − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 + Np2 18
Hybrid
0 ≤ K2 ≤ s(v1 − v2)
β
Nβγ
s
N − K2
β + γ
+ λl1N + Np1 5
s(v1 − v2)
β
≤ K2 ≤ s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
Nβ
s
s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
+ λNl2 + Np2 6
s(u1 − u2) + Nγ
β + γ
≤ K2 ≤ s(u1 − u2) + Nγ + s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
7
Nβ − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
≤ K1 ≤ Nβ + s(u2 − u1) − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
Nβ
s
(N − K1 − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
) + λNl2 + Np2 9
(u2 − u1)s
β + γ
≤ K1 ≤ Nβ − s(v1 − v2)
β + γ
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 + Np2 10
0 ≤ K1 ≤ (u2 − u1)s
β + γ
11
Other K1 = 0,K2 = N
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl2 + Np2 19
K1 = N,K2 = 0
N2βγ
s(β + γ)
+ λNl1 + Np1 20
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The sign of dTSCda1 and
dTSC
da2
is dependent on the values of all parameters.
We also have,
dTD
da1
=
dTD
dΔ p¯
dΔ p¯
da1
=
2
3
s
α(β + γ)
(2Δp¯ − (2λ + γ − β)Δl)
dTD
da2
=
dTD
dΔ p¯
dΔ p¯
da2
= −2
3
s
α(β + γ)
(2Δp¯ − (2λ + γ − β)Δl)
The sign of dTDda1 and
dTD
da2
is dependent on the values of all parameters.
Suppose l1 is ﬁxed in the closer cluster, and the private operators in the farther cluster may improve the accessibility
so as to reduce l2. Our derivation yields,
dTCC
dl2
=
N
6(β + γ)
((β + γ)(2λ − γ − β) + 2γ(λ − β))
dTSC
dl2
=
Nγ(β + λ)
β + γ
+
2λ + γ − β
9(β + γ)
(
2sΔa − 2sΔl(2λ + γ − β) − N(γ − β)
2
)
dTD
dl2
=
2(γ + 2β − λ)(λ + 2γ + β)
9
+ (
N(β − γ)
2s
+ Δa)
γ + 2λ − β
9
The sign of dTCCdl2 ,
dTSC
dl2
and dTDdl2 is dependent on the values of all parameters.
Finally, by diﬀerentiating Equation 19 and 20 with respect to p1 and p2, we get,
dTCC
dp1
=
Nβ
β + γ
> 0
dTCC
dp2
=
Nγ
β + γ
> 0
dTSC
dp1
=
s
β + γ
(4Δp − (2λ + γ − β)Δl − 2Δa)
dTSC
dp2
=
s
β + γ
(−4Δp + (2λ + γ − β)Δl + 2Δa)
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